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Adverse possession and Crown Leasehold in Queensland 
Context 
The decision of Eckford v Stanbroke Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [2012] QSC 48 ,although a decision 
refusing summary judgement raises  a very important question of the ability to claim adverse 
possession of a pastoral lease issued in 1956  under the Land Act 1962 (Queensland).Division 
5 of Part 6 of the Land Title Act 1994  (Qld) which guarantees registered freehold title 
expressly deals with the right of adverse possession however, there is no such provision in the 
present Land Act 1994 unlike s 170 of the Crown Lands Act 1989(NSW) which expressly 
precludes claims for adverse possession of specified non freehold land. There is no mention 
of adverse possession in any version of the Queensland  Land Acts and only s 6(4) of the 
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 makes it clear that “the right, title or interest of the Crown” in 
or to any land is not affected by any adverse possessor.It is against the background that  the 
Court considered the right of an adverse possessor to  a Crown lease. 
Facts 
The Crown lease was to the affected property was granted in 1956 although it had since 
changed hands, the present owner being a lessee since 1986.Evidence was adduced that 
sometime before 1967 a fence divided the affected property from its neighbour which was 
improperly sited so that approximately 23,000 acres of neighbouring land was incorporated 
into the claimant’s land which was used ,at least since 1973,to runs cattle,for the issue of 
water licences, to maintain water bores and to maintain the wrongly sited fence. The claimant 
sought to bring an action seeking leasehold title to the 23,000 acres as an adverse possessor. 
The Limitations of Actions Act 1974(Qld) was an almost identical rescript of the 1960 Act 
which governed this situation .For the purposes of this note, it can be assumed that the 
adverse possessor had sufficiently demonstrated   a case in fact for the purposes of this 
application to take possession of the property through these means if they were available 
under the Land Act 1962.( at [7]-[9])The note is therefore confined to the central issue in the 
judgment as to whether such a right could be enforced against a pastoral lessee. 
Analysis 
The lessee whose pastoral lease was adversely possessed argued that whilst an ordinary 
commercial lessee who has been dispossessed has a right under ss 13 and 24 of the Limitation 
of Actions Act 1974 to recover the “land” dispossessed  before the title is extinguished ,this 
provision did not apply to the holder of a pastoral lease under the Land Act 1962 (or any 
subsequent re-enactment) upon the basis that a pastoral lease was wholly a creature of statute 
and the rights of lessees were regulated exclusively by the statute and not the common law [at 
10]. 
The extent to which general law concepts apply to Queensland Crown leases  to is a vexed 
issue not directly raised in the case. In Plastic Enterprises Pty Ltd v Southern Cross 
Assurance Co Ltd [1968] Qd R 401 the Full Court of Queensland     said in relation to the 
Land Act 1962  that such Act provided “an exceptional mode of dealing with a lease of 
Crown land embedded in an elaborate code for the controlling and regulating of all dealings 
with holdings”[at 405]..Conversely, in Browne v Wood [1984] 2 Qd R 593 the Full Court 
recognised an arrangement which amounted to a licence ( based upon proprietory  estoppel) 
given by a lessee under the Land Act 1962  was not prohibited as it was not  an arrangement 
expressly regulated by the Act. Campbell CJ (with whom Kelly J agreed) held [at 602] that 
the Act did not remove the power of the lessee to create and dispose of other lesser interests 
in leasehold land”. In other words ,if the dealing did not amount to a transfer or a subletting 
(requiring Ministerial consent) then it could be comprehended within the framework of the 
Act. These types of statements leave the issue in limbo   perhaps requiring that each type of 
“dealing” be considered on a case by case basis  and certainly provide little guide to what 
actions may be tolerated or interest recognised in a Crown lease.(See the extensive 
commentary on these issues by Boge, Property Law and Practice in Queensland (The Land 
Act) at L332.30-L332.70]. 
Dalton J then considered the very wide meaning of the term “land” in  s5 the Limitation of 
Actions Act  1974 and noted that s 5(5)  expanded the notion of the “right to recover land” to 
include a right to “enter possession of the land”.[at 11-13] and the fact that at the relevant 
time ,the pastoral lease was excluded from the definition of “Crown land.” Her Honour then 
adverted to the extensive analysis  of the nature of a grant of a pastoral lease in Queensland in 
Wik Peoples v Queensland  (1996) 187 CLR 1 which found that the existence of native title 
rights was not inconsistent with  the existence of continuing native title rights citing 
Gummow J [(1996) 187 CLR 1 at 193-195] 
Taking this analogy, Dalton J found that in the case of an adverse possessor, exercise of 
rights by the true lessee was incompatible with the exerciser of rights by the adverse 
possessor[at 25] and that the Limitation of Actions Act  was directed to actions of ejectment  
to recover “possession” and that this right was not inconsistent with the fact that the right to 
possession of the incumbent lessee was solely a right granted by statute the enforcement of 
which was not inconsistent with that statute (at [29]-32]). 
Dalton J then addressed the issue of whether the exercise of the right of an adverse possessor 
was  an attempt to  circumvent s 5(5) of the Limitations of Actions Act 1974 by asserting the 
extinguishment of the right against the Crown. Her Honour considered that the rights being 
asserted were against the pastoral lessee and had no effect upon the rights of the Crown 
which may be resumed at the expiry of the pastoral lease ,or in other words” there is no sense 
in which the (adverse possessor’s) possession of the disputed land was at any time adverse to 
the interest of the Crown”(at [35]). 
Dalton J dismissed the argument  that as there was no mention of adverse possession in the 
legislation that no such right could be contemplated upon the basis that the assertion of the 
right was not a “dealing” and that as such the right to possession did not require Ministerial 
consent for validity ([at 40]). 
 Conclusions 
It is clear that the law in this area is very unsettled and that the general law rights of parties to 
pastoral leases under the  Land Act 1994 (and its predecessors) have been treated differently 
in different circumstances. Given the variety of these circumstances that may arise, perhaps 
some legislative remedy may reduce the need for litigation  such as this  in the future 
although it is recognised that not every matter could be covered. Adverse possession is not an 
uncommon occurrence and is expressly dealt within the Land Title Act 1994 in relation to fee 
simple holdings for that very reason after a number of  conflicting decisions upon the rights 
of an adverse possessor reminiscent of the instant case . 
Although the judgment was in the context of the dismissal of an application for summary 
judgment and an interlocutory application only, the Dalton J   found that the plaintiff (adverse 
possessors) had a “real prospect of succeeding”  in a judgment which was well considered 
and  which raised a number of very important issues .These issues may be further ventilated 
at a trial  of the action if the matter proceeds .However, given the difficulty  and importance 
of the issues raised ,it is felt this note is justified at this stage. 
 
Professor Bill Duncan 
Faculty of Law,  
Queensland University of Technology 
Brisbane. 
